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II. ARGUMENT
A. A justiciable controversy exists
The State asserts that Wylie did not address the issue of justiciability. However, the
majority of the opening brief directly supports Wylie's position that he has presented ajusticable
issue. The District Court ruled that the Development Agreement precluded Wylie's ability to
seek access independently of the City Ordinance, so deeming it invalid would provide Wylie no
relief, i.e. the issue was moot. Wylie's position on appeal directly challenges the validity of the
Development Agreement for three independent reasons. If Wylie prevails on anyone of those
theories (set forth below) then the case is justiciable:
1) There was no waiver or conveyance of the ability to seek access; 1
2) The theory of field preemption makes the alleged waiver in the contract and the
reference to the City Ordinance void, and therefore severable from the contract; and
3) The theory of ultra vires makes the case justiciable for the same reasons as field
preemption.
1. Declaratory actions can be used to challenge municipal ordinances.
Declaratory judgments are governed by I.C. § 10-1201, which states:
10-1202. PERSON INTERESTED OR AFFECTED MAY HAVE DECLARATION.
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a
contract or any oral contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected
by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any
question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance,
contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations
thereunder. (emphasis added).
In the context of the LLUPA, a party has standing if the zoning regulation adversely
impacts their property. See Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 75, 73 P.3d 84,88 (2003).
LLUPA confers standing to seek judicial review of a local land use decision to an
"affected person" aggrieved by the decision. I.C. § 67-6521 (d). This Court notes that
while it recognizes the underlying policy of I.C. § 67 -6521 (d) conferring standing to
I

Appellant's Brief, pp 28-31 addresses these three points.
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affected persons, the legislature cannot, by statute, relieve a party from meeting the
fundamental constitutional requirements for standing. See Noh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho
798,53 P.3d 1217 (2002). An affected person is "one having an interest in real property
which may be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a permit authorizing the
development." I.C. § 67-6521(a) (emphasis added).
Wylie owns property directly abutting SH 20/26, which creates a general right of access
to SH 20126, which is an interest in real property. Wylie applied for a zoning variance
application and was denied based on City Ordinance 05-1171. This is functionally a denial of an
access permit to SH 20/26 which adversely affects Wylie's real property interest.
Wyle disagrees that the Development Agreement, or any of the extrinsic evidence
pointed out by lTD and the City, function as a waiver. Absent the Development Agreement,
only City Ordinance 05-1171 is preventing Wylie from seeking access, and that was the only
material reason the City denied his variance request for direct access to SH 20/26.

2. The Development Agreement is irrelevant because the alleged waiver is void.
Even if it is determined that Wylie is contractually bound from seeking access, there is a
justiciable controversy because, as argued throughout the proceedings below, the provisions in
the contracts which prevent Wylie from seeking access are void. They are void as ultra vires
because the City has no power to restrict access to state highways. Contracts entered into with
an entity that cannot control the subject matter ofthe contract are void. See Olympic Pipe Line
Co. v. City ofSeattle, 437 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2006). They are also void because only lTD can
regulate access to state highways. All of the Idaho case law cited to indicates that the law of
contracts cannot be used to circumvent the express will of the Idaho Legislature.
The issues before this Court are not moot or hypothetical. If City Ordinance 05-1171 is
deemed void, then the provisions in the contract created under its power or auspicious are void as
well. Since the development agreement has a severance clause, then those illegal or
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unenforceable portions of the contract are severed from the contract and all the valid provision
.

remaIn.

2

3. Hypothetical facts cannot be used to deny the justiciability of an actual controversy.
lTD has also asserted that lTD will deny access in the event the City cannot. 3 However,
this is a mere assertion by counsel. Even though lTD initially denied Wylie's access permit,
Wylie still has an administrative appeal pending. If after that appeal is taken, if Wylie has his
agency appeal denied, he can still seek a judicial review from that denial. Moreover, if access is
still denied, then Wylie will have perfected an inverse condemnation claim against the State by
exhausting his administrative remedies. Counsel for lTD cannot speak for his client and assert
that his client will deny the appeal. Moreover, Counsel for lTD cannot predict the result of a
judicial review, in the event lTD denies the administrative appeal. Therefore, it is premature to
deem this appeal moot based on mere assertions of counsel regarding future proceedings. No
case or controversy exists when the alleged facts are hypothetical. An action cannot be
dismissed as moot based on speCUlative and hypothetical facts or any other bold statements from
State's Counsel.

4. An abutter's right of access is a property right.
Every owner of real property that abuts an existing roadway has an abutter's right of
access. 4 Despite the line of authority cited by Wylie in his opening brief, the City has argued that
the right of access is not a vested property right. s This court has held, "[t]he Idaho Constitution
also guarantees its citizens the right of due process if private property is taken for a public use,
pursuant to Article I, § 13, and provides for just compensation for such a taking, pursuant to

R. Vol. I, p. 198
Brief of Respondent State ofIdaho Idaho Transportation Department, p. 30.
4 Appellants' Brief. p. 15.
5 Respondent City of Meridian's Brief, pp. 24-30.
2

3
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Article I, § 14." (emphasis added) Moon v. North Idaho Farmers Ass'n, 140 Idaho 536, 642, 96
P.3d 637,541(2004). All the cases cited in Wylie's opening brief are condemnation cases. In
those cases the issue being addressed was under what circumstances the taking of the property
right of access is compensable. The general rule in all those cases is that an abutter's right of
access is a cognizable real property interest which must be compensated for when appropriated
by a governing entity.
The City argues that these cases predated the LL UP A and the creation of the ITD' s
Board. 6 The City points to no code provision or any other authority indicating that either of
these two events were intended to alter the basic real property law in Idaho. Just because the
State7 has the ability to regulate a private citizen's ability to exercise their property right of
access, does not mean that the creation of ITD has destroyed previously existing property rights.
The basic rules of statutory construction cut against the City's assertion. "Statutes are
construed under the assumption that the legislature was aware of all other statutes and legal
precedence at the time the statute was passed." McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228, 236, 61 P.3d
585, 593 (2002) (internal citation omitted); See also Ahles v. Tabor, 136 Idaho 393, 396, 34 P.3d
1076, 1079 (2001) ("In utilizing specific terms in a statute, it must be presumed, unless indicated
otherwise, that the legislature intended those terms to be interpreted in accordance with existing
judicial decisions.") (internal citation omitted). "The legislature is presumed not to intend to
overturn long established principles of law unless an intention to do so plainly appears by
express declaration or the language employed admits of no other reasonable construction."
McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228, 236, 61 P.3d 585,593 (2002) (internal citation omitted).

6

7

Respondent City of Meridian's Brief, p. 26.
Wylie contests that the LLUPA is even a statute dealing with property rights or highways.
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What the City is asserting would require an amendment to the Idaho Constitution.
Article I, § 14 of the Idaho Constitution states that property cannot be taken without just
compensation. See City of Pocatello v. Anderton, 106 Idaho 370, 374-75, 679 P.2d 647,651-52
(1984) ("[ ... A]n eminent domain proceeding is a constitutional action, and not one created by the
legislature, or by the courts. So postured, it is beyond the power of the courts or of the legislature
to deprive a property owner of his property without paying a fair and just compensation [... ]")
(original emphasis) (internal citations omitted). There is absolutory no authority whereby the
State can redefine real property to avoid the requirements of Article I, § 14 of the Idaho
Constitution. There is no difference between this argument and asserting that the legislature can
define real property to not include attached structures, to avoid paying just compensation for the
condemnation of people's homes.
The definition of real property as contained in I.e. § 55-101 was not amended when the
LLUPA was passed and lTD was created. I.C. § 55-101(3) states:
REAL PROPERTY DEFINED. Real property or real estate consists of:
3. That which is appurtenant to land.
That which is appurtenant to the land are property rights, and access easements, by
their very nature, constitute appurtenant easements. See Killinger v. Twin Falls Highway Dist.,
135 Idaho 322, 325, 17 P.3d 266,269 (2000) ("This Court has recognized the right of a property
owner to access a public way is a vested property right appurtenant to the land abutting the
public way in question, and that an unreasonable limitation upon such a right may constitute a
taking requiring compensation.") (emphasis added) (citing to Brown v. City of Twin Falls, 124
Idaho 39, 41,855 P.2d 876,878 (1993) (citing Johnston v. Boise City, 87 Idaho 44, 390 P.2d 291

(1964); Farris v. City of Twin Falls, 81 Idaho 583,347 P.2d 996 (1959); Hughes v. State, 80
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Idaho 286, 328 P.2d 397 (1958)); see also Bare v. Dept. of Highways, 88 Idaho 467, 471, 401
P.2d 552, 554 (1965)).

5. The government's ability to regulate access does not alter its nature as a property
interest.
The City has pointed to cases that stand for the proposition that when the government
regulates access, as opposed to directly condemning it, then sometimes the government does not
have to pay just compensation for the that impairment of a property right. See Mabe v. State ex
reI. Rich, 83 Idaho 222, 360 P.2d 799 (1961), etc .... 8 However, the very fact that the State

compensates property owners for condemning their access presupposes they are property rights
because just compensation is only paid when property is condemned.
Further, the City asserts that access must be a vested property right and Wylie's access
rights are not vested. 9 The City cited no authority for this proposition. The property right of
access is not created by lTD's decision to grant an access permit, nor does the existence of
LLUP A affect the existence of access rights in Idaho property law. The property right of access
is vested when an individual obtains an ownership interest a free hold or lease hold estate.
Ownership of an access right exists outside of any government regulation. It is only upon the
property owner's decision to exercise that property right that the government enters the equation,
and may reasonably regulate the right. If lTD decides to deny an access permit, then the
property owner has a cause of action in inverse condemnation, for the regulatory condemnation
of a property right. At that point in time, the case law dealing with a regulation of access
becomes relevant.
Since the right of access is a real property interest, ahsent a deed conveying access rights,
or a court order condemning access rights, they were not conveyed, and can still be exercised by
8
9

Respondent City of Meridian's Brief, pp. 25-26.
Respondent City of Meridian's Brief, pp. 25-27.
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Wylie. Any statement made by Wylie or his predecessor in interest that they were not intending
to seek access does not mean they conveyed or deeded their property rights to the City.
The manner in which the City uses the word vested implies that access rights must be
perfected or recognized by a government entity before they become a legally cognizable interest.
However, the City does not cite to, nor is Wylie is aware of, any authority which supports this
position. An access permit merely guarantees access at a specific location, but it is not a
condition precedent to the creation ofthe property interest referred to as a right of access. As
stated above, access easements are appurtenant rights which are part of an estate in land. An
ownership or leasehold interest in real estate is all that is needed to have a vested access right.

6. Neither Wylie nor his predecessor in interest waived the ability to seek access to
SH 20/26.
In the proceedings below, the only evidence in support of the issue of waiver was the
statement used by the Trial Court, which follows:
The subject property does have frontage along Chinden Boulevard (State Highway 2026) but is not proposing direct access to that facility. 10
Wylie's opening brief sets forth his position that this does not evince a contractual waiver of
Wylie's ability to seek access to SH 20/26. 11
In the City's and ITD's briefs they argue waiver far more extensively than they did
below, where only passing references to facts no apparently relied upon are made, in support of
their waiver theory. 12 These are addressed below.

R. Vol. II, p. 210.
Appellant's Brief, pp. 28-31.
12 Brief of Respondent, State of Idaho Idaho Transportation Department, pp 4-8 and Respondent City of Meridian's
Brief, pp. 7-12
10
11
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7. Extrinsic evidence is barred by the parol evidence rule.
The State points out that Wylie's predecessor in interest made several representations that
the Subdivision would not request a variance from the Meridian Zoning ordinance. 13
Idaho adheres to the parol evidence rule. "The parol evidence rule is a rule of contract
interpretation which forbids the admission of evidence concerning prior or contemporaneous
agreements for the purpose of varying or contradicting a later writing. Thus, in the case of a fully
integrated and executed written contract, the intent of the parties must be determined by
reference to the writing and not to prior or contemporaneous agreements." Miller Const. Co. v.
Stresstek, a Div. of L.R. Yegge, Co., 108 Idaho 187, 190,697 P.2d 1201, 1204(Ct. App. 1985).
"A written contract that contains a merger clause is complete upon its face." (internal citation
omitted) Howard v. Perry, 141 Idaho 139, 142, 106 P.3d 465,468 (2005).
Section 21 of the development agreement contains a merger or integration clause. 14 In
accordance with Howard, supra, the existence of this clause indicates that the Development
Agreement is a complete and final agreement. Therefore, any prior or contemporaneous
evidence used by the either the State or the City to add a term of waiver into the Development
Agreement must be rejected. See Miller Const., supra.
The State cites no authority that Wylie is bound by negotiations that were not part of the
Development Agreement, which is also barred by the parol evidence rule. More importantly,
one portion of the record relied on by the State provides that the only reason direct access was
not sought by Wylie's predecessor in interest was the existence of the City's zoning ordinance
being challenged in this appeal. "The enclosed applications have been submitted in accordance
with the requirements of the Meridian Zoning Ordinance. As a result, this application does not

13
14

Brief of Respondent, State ofIdaho Idaho Transportation Department, p. 4.
R. Vol. I, pp 198-199.
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include a request for variance or deviation from the ordinance.,,15 Again, this language does not
indicate any intention to forego the ability to seek access in the future.
8. The statute of frauds prevents oral conveyances of access rights.

The State also points out that the Development Agreements reference representations
made by Wylie's predecessor in interest at public meetings. 16 These representations are not
contractually binding, and if oral are within the statute of frauds.
In Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286, 295, 328 P.2d 397, 402 (1958), this Court pointed out
that an abutters right of access is an interest in real property. The specific language used follows:
Our review of Idaho's Constitution, statutes and decisions, clearly shows that the power
of eminent domain extends to every kind of property taken for public use, including the
right of access to public streets, such being an estate or interest in and appurtenant
to real property; and since such right of access constitutes an interest in, by virtue of
being an easement appurtenant to, a larger parcel, the court, jury or referee must
ascertain and assess the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned by reason of the severance of the portion-the right of access-sought to be
condemned, and the construction of the improvement. (citation omitted).
Idaho also adheres to the statute of frauds as contained in I.C. § 9-503 which states:
9-503. TRANSFERS OF REAL PROPERTY TO BE IN WRITING. No estate or
interest in real property, other than for leases for a term not exceeding one (1) year, nor
any trust or power over or concerning it, or in any manner relating thereto, can be
created, granted, assigned, surrendered, or declared, otherwise than by operation of law,
or a conveyance or other instrument in writing, subscribed by the party creating, granting,
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized
by writing. (emphasis added)17
Easements are interests in property which fall under the protections of Idaho's statute of
frauds. "The alleged easement in question constituted an interest in real property within the
meaning of the statute and required a writing subscribed by the grantor in order to be created."
Fajen v. Powlus, 96 Idaho 625, 628, 533 P.2d 746, 749 (1975) (citing to ~McReynolds v.
R. Vol. I, p. 157.
Brief of Respondent, State of Idaho Idaho Transportation Department, p. 5.
17 Wylie is aware that the Statute of Frauds was not argued in the hearings below, but new emphasis by City and
lTD on the oral representations warrants this argument.
15

16
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Harrigfeld, 26 Idaho 26, 140 P. 1096 (1914)). See also Bob Daniels and Sons v. Weaver, 106
Idaho 535, 541-42, 681 P.2d 1010, 1016-17 (Ct. App. 1984) ("Moreover, easements are interests
in real property. Idaho Code § 9-505(5) (the "statute of frauds") provides, with exceptions not
applicable here, that interests in real property must be transferred by written instrument. An oral
agreement must be evidenced by a written memorandum. No such memorandum appears in this
record. Failure to comply with the statute renders an oral agreement unenforceable both in law
and in equity. E.g., Hoffman v. S V Co., 102 Idaho 187,628 P.2d 218 (1981). An easement
established by unwritten agreement is merely a license, revocable by the licensor. Howes v.
Barman, 11 Idaho 64,81 P. 48 (1905)).
According to the preceding authority, rights of access are easements, which are real
property interests. These interests are subject to the statute of frauds, which requires that a
writing must be used to prove that a real property interest was surrendered. Absent a writing,
any oral agreement to surrender a real property interest is void in law and equity.
The State also asserts that in the application stages for Wylie's April of2008 plat
proposal to the City there were prior written statements concerning Wylie's intent to not seek
direct access. IS Again this is parol evidence and not binding. Moreover, these statements do not
indicate that Wylie was conveying his access rights to the City, which would require a writing to
comport with the requirements of the statute of frauds.

9. The extrinsic evidence indicates there was no waiver.
lTD directly points out for the first time on appeal that in the staff report attached to the
City'S approval of Wylie's 2008 plat revision, contained the same sentence that was in the staff

18

Brief of Respondent, State of Idaho Idaho Transportation Department, p. 6.
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report in the Development Agreement signed by Wylie's predecessor in interest. 19 That
language follows:
The subject property does have frontage along Chinden Boulevard (State Highway 2026) but is not proposing direct access to that facility.2o
This language appears in both the 2006 staff report and the 2008 staff report.
The use of this language in 2008 indicates that the City did not interpret it to mean that
access was waived in the 2006 Development Agreement. If it was truly a waiver the first time it
appeared, the 2008 staff report would have indicated that Wylie's processor in interest had
frontage to SH 20126 but had conveyed those access rights to the City in the previous contract.
There is no reference to a waiver of access rights in the 2008 staff report. The language used in
the 2008 staff report appears to indicate the City recognized Wylie could still seek access in 2008
despite the 2006 Development Agreement.
This argument applies to any waiver positions advocated by the City or the lTD which is
derived from the 2006 Development Agreement. If that document contained anything which the
City thought was a waiver of Wylie's access rights why did the City not bring that up in the
2008? Moreover, in 2009 when Wylie sought direct access, the City did not raise waiver, the
City only denied Wylie's request based on the City Ordinance.

21 Again, ifthe City truly thought

that the Development Agreement expressly waived his right to seek access, the City would have
probably pointed it out. Further, the actual body of the Development Agreement does not
contain any language indicating a waiver or conveyance of Wylie's access rights.
However, Section 15 of the Development Agreement states that the owner of the
Subdivision has to adhere to all City Ordinances in effect at the time the Development

19
20
21

Brief of Respondent, State of Idaho Idaho Transportation Department, p. 6.
R. Vol. II, p. 285.
R. Vol. II, p 335.
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Agreement is executed?2 That provision is clearly in the body of the Development Agreement.
That is the very reason used by the City to deny Wylie's request for direct access. Up until
litigation ensued, the conduct of the parties did not indicate a waiver. Wylie's predecessor in
interest did not seek direct access because ofthe City Ordinance?3 When Wylie sought direct
access he was denied access not based on contractual waiver, but based on the City Ordinance
In the event of an ambiguity, " ... court may consider the objective and purpose of the
agreement and the conduct of the parties to the agreement." Bischoffv. Quong-Watkins
Properties, 113 Idaho 826, 829, 748 P.2d 410,413 (Ct. App. 1987). "In determining the parties'
intent under an ambiguous contract, the trier of fact may consider the objective and purpose of
the agreement, as well as the conduct of the parties to the agreement." George v. University of
Idaho, 121 Idaho 30, 35-36,822 P.2d 549,554-55 (Ct. App. 1991). According to the parties'
conduct, prior to this litigation, there was not a waiver.

10. Wylie did not need to seek declaratory judgment on the Development Agreement.
lTD has argued that Wylie did not seek declaratory relief from the development
agreement and therefore his pleadings fail for alleging a case or controversy.24 In Wylie's
Amended Complaint he alleged that he had a property interest, that the actions of the City based
on the City Ordinance adversely affected his property right. That is enough to establish a
justicable case or controversy under Idaho law.
The issue of waiver contained in the Development Agreement was functionally an
affirmative defense asserted by the City and lTD. Wylie is not aware of, nor has the City or lTD
cited to any authority, requiring that the plaintiff, in a declaratory relief action must affirmatively

22
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R. Vo 1. I, p. 197.
R. Vol. I, P 157.
Brief of Respondent, State of Idaho Idaho Transportation Department, pp. 14-15.
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plead facts of the Defendant's affirmative defenses. The section of the case cited by ITD,25
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc. 549 U.S. 118, 125 (2007), was the second section ofthe case

dealing with the nature of the dispute, not justicability, which was dealt with by the Supreme
Court in section one of MedImmune opinion.
B. Only lTD can regulate access to State Highways
lTD and the City both cite to I.C. § 67-6508, I.C. § 67-6511A, and IDAPA §
39.03.48.001 for the proposition that the City can make recommendations on access and that lTD
and the City can collaborate on access issues. 26 Wylie does not contest these assertions, but he
does contest that they enable the City to control access.
These issues were addressed by this Court in Lochsa Falls, L.L.C v. State, 147 Idaho
232,207 P.3d 963 (2009). In that case, a developer Lochsa Falls was in the process of building a
development in the City of Meridian, which abuts SH 20/26. In 2003 the City was the party
which approved the preliminary plat of the development. However, "[b]ecause Chinden
Boulevard is designated as a controlled-access highway, lTD required the Lochsa Falls obtain an
encroachment permit." Lochsa Falls, 147 Idaho at 235,207 P.2d at 966. While the main issues
in Lochsa Falls are not relevant to this appeal, this Court's analysis in coming to its conclusion
that lTD issues encroachment permits bares directly to the issues at hand.
After listing the provisions in the Idaho Code which establish that lTD has the exclusive
authority to control access to state highways. This Court stated:
Clearly, the legislature has empowered lTD and its Board to make rules and
regulations controlling rights of access and the safe use of state highways. (emphasis
added) Lochsa Falls, 147 Idaho at 238, 207 P.2d at 969.

Brief of Respondent, State ofIdaho Idaho Transportation Department, pp. 14-15.
Brief of Respondent, State ofIdaho Idaho Transportation Department, pp. 15-20; Respondent City of Meridian's
Briefpp.16-24.
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This Court went on to hold:
In appreciation of the specific IDAPA rules and provisions of the Idaho Code as set
forth above, we conclude that the power to impose certain specific conditions upon an
application for an encroachment permit, including, but not limited to, provision of bonds
and construction of traffic signals, is within the scope of the legislature'S grant of
authority to lTD to regulate the safe use of and access to controlled access highways.
[... ]Because the lTD's denial or approval of an encroachment permit application
determines the legal rights and interests of a property owner in accessing their property
from a state highway[. .. ]. (emphasis added) Lochsa Falls, 147 Idaho at 239, 207 P.2d at
970.
The following points can be distilled from the foregoing. First, only lTD and its Board
are empowered by the Idaho legislature to make rules and regulations controlling access to state
highways. Second, this power includes the ability to approve access or deny access to a state
highway.
This Court has made another ruling which sheds light on the statutes contested in this
appeal. In City o/Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Ind Highway Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 879 P.2d 1078
(1994), the issues raised dealt with which entity, the City of Sandpoint or the Sand Point
Highway District, could control highways within the common boundaries and which entity was
required to maintain the highways. The first point made by this Court was that:
In a persuasive dissent, Judge Burnett pointed out that the purposes of the two sets of
statutes are different. The Local Planning Act "dealt primarily with land use regulation,
not highways." Worley, 104 Idaho at 838, 663 P.2d at 1140. Thus while there may be
some overlap in the authority given to the county and the highway district, the general
provisions regarding land use regulation do not control over the specific authority given
to highway districts to supervise and control those highways within their boundaries. We
have held that when there are specific statutes addressing an issue, those statutes control
over more general statutes. E.g., Walker v. Shoshone County, 112 Idaho 991, 739 P.2d
290 (1987). Thus, the municipal corporation statutes (title 50), and highway district
statutes (title 40), control as to the issue of street maintenance, over the more general
provisions ofthc Local Planning Act. City o/Sandpoint, 126 Idaho at 149, 879 P.2d at
1082.
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In resolving the dispute between the City and the Highway District, this Court went on to
point out that under I.C. § 50-1330 and I.C. § 40-1323, only cities with functioning street
departments can have jurisdiction over streets when the city is located in a county with a
highway district. The specific holding follows:
[... W]e hold that the Highway District has exclusive general supervisory authority to
maintain the streets within the Highway District absent a showing by the City that it has a
functioning street department."
The following can therefore be derived. First, the LLUPA I.C. § 67-6501 et. seq, deals
with land use regulations not highways regulations. Second, since I.C. § 40-101 et seq, is
specific to highways in an instances where the LLUPA conflicts with Title 40 ofthe I.C., Title
40 of the I.C. trumps LLUPA concerning highway issues.
In City ojSandpoint, this Court also adopted a portion of Appellate Judge Burnett's
dissent in Worley Highway District v. Kootenai County, 104 Idaho 833, 663 P.2d 1135 (Ct.App.
1983). The full paragraph containing the sentence this Court cited to in City ojSandpoint
follows:
In 1975 the Legislature passed the Local Planning Act. This legislation dealt primarily
with land use regulation, not highways; but it contained language authorizing cities and
counties to include "recommendations on ... street naming and numbering" in their
comprehensive plans, and to establish standards for "street numbers and names." I.C. §§
67-6508(g), 6518. The bill embodying the Local Planning Act contained no provision for
repeal of any prior, inconsistent laws. See 1975 Idaho Sess.Laws, ch. 188. Moreover, at §
67-6528, the Legislature directed special purpose districts to "comply with allplans and
ordinances adopted under this chapter unless otherwise provided by law [emphasis
supplied]. (emphasis added) Worley Highway District, 104 Idaho at 838,663 P.2d at
1140.
The following paragraph states:
In my view, the message from these statutes is clear. A highway district has 'exclusive'
authority over public streets within its jurisdiction. The subject matter of this authority
extends not only to powers expressly granted by the highway district, but also to powers
that would be exercised by the county commissioners had the highway district not been
organized. Id.
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Judge Burnett then goes on to clearly articulate the very interpretation of these statues
advocated by the Wylie throughout this action.
In the present case, I believe that all the statutes, taken together, reflect two legislative
policies-the recent policy of encouraging planning, and the historical policy of preserving
the authority of highway districts within their boundaries. In my view, the statutes can be
harmonized by recognizing that they embody a balance of these competing legislative
concerns. Planning with respect to highways is not the sole province of counties.
(emphasis added) Worley Highway District, 104 Idaho at 839, 663 P.2d at 1141.
The very language "make recommendations on... control of access ... " contained in I.C. §
67 -6508, which ITD and the City rely on to support their argument that the City has concurrent
authority over state highways, was analyzed by Judge Burnett. He concluded that this language
allows Cities' and Counties to participate in the planning process. However, the ability to make
recommendations is limited to just that, the planning process. The LLUP A does not alter a
highway district's 'exclusive' authority over the final determination of street naming and
numbering, or in this matter access control.
Unlike City a/Sandpoint and Worley Highway District this matter does not involve a
highway district, it deals with the State ofIdaho and the City of Meridian's respective powers
concerning access control to state highways. Despite this difference, there is no reason why
these facts would lead to a different result than those contained in City ofSandpoint and Worley

Highway District. Moreover, in the context of the States' power to control access to state
highways there is even more direction provided by the legislature. As pointed out in Wylie's
opening brief, I.C. 40-301(9) states:
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POWERS AND DUTIES - STATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM. The board shall27 :
(9) Designate state highways, or parts of them, as controlled-access facilities and
regulate, restrict or prohibit access to those highways to serve the traffic for which the
facility is intended. (emphasis added).
IDAPA § 39.03.48.001 states:
001 TITLE AND SCOPE. - [... ] The intent ofthis legislative provision is to prevent
local control over improvements to transportation systems of statewide importance.
(emphasis added) .
I.C. § 67-6528 states:
The provisions of plans and ordinances enacted pursuant to this chapter shall not apply to
transportation systems of statewide importance as may be determined by the Idaho
transportation board. (emphasis added).
Title 40 of the Idaho Code, which according to City of Sandpoint governs highways, only
allocates power to lTD to control access to state highways. Contrary to lTD's assertion that both
the City and lTD share the ability to deny access, I.C. § 40-301(9) expressly states that the Board
of lTD can prohibit access. lTD in its IDAP A regulations indicated that its express policy is
against local control over state highways.28 The LLUPA expressly excepts state highways from
the land use powers granted to Counties and Cities under its provisions.
The City points out that IDAPA § 39.03.48.001 also states that:
The intent ofthis legislative provision is to prevent local control over improvements to
transportation systems of statewide importance. However, it is recognized by the Idaho
Transportation Board that local regulations are necessary to achieve the future location,
relocation, realignment and other improvements to the state highway system in accord
with the Idaho Transportation Board's plans.

Use of the word shall, in a statute, is a mandatory legislative directive. Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 848, 908 P.2d
143,150 (1995) ("When used in a statute, the word 'may' is permissive rather than the imperative or mandatory
meaning of 'must' or 'shall"'); See also Paolini v. Albertson's Inc., 143 Idaho 547,549, 149 P.3d 822, 824 (2006);
Goffv. HJ.H Co., 95 Idaho 837, 839,521 P.2d 661,663 (1974).
27
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IDAPA § 39.03.48.001
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Both sentences read together indicate the same two policy goals expressed by Judge
Burnett. First, the State, not municipalities has the ultimate authority to make decisions
concerning decisions over state highways. Second, ITD recognizes that localities have the
ability to regulate in their sphere of power and these entities need to work together. Despite this
cooperative relationship, ultimate and exclusive authority resides in the State when regulating
state highways. Moreover, the local regulations referred to in IDAPA § 39.03.48.001 are, in
accordance with City of Sandpoint, deal with land use not highways. The City can decide how a
plat will be zoned, while the State decides where to put the access points to its highways.
1. lTD cannot delegate its powers to the City.

When an agency is delegated a power it must exercise that power it cannot diminish its
responsibilities. Roberts v. Transportation Dept., 121 Idaho 727, 732, 827 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Ct.
App. 1991) ("An agency must exercise any authority granted by statute within the framework of
that statutory grant. Adams v. Industrial Comm'n, 26 Ariz.App. 289, 547 P.2d 1089 (1976). It
may not exercise its sub-legislative powers to modify, alter, enlarge or diminish the provisions of
the legislative act which is being administered") (internal citations omitted).
On numerous occasions lTD and the City assert that they drafted City Ordinance 05-1171
together and therefore it is enforceable, and not an usurpation oflTDs delegated authorities. 29
For one, these are admissions by both the State and the City that they are working under an
express agreement whereby they collectively have denied access to SH 20/26. However, it does
not matter ifITD was cooperating with the City or even ifthey were operating under an express
agreement whereby ITD agreed to allow the City to control access to state highways. Only lTD
has been delegated the authority to control access to state highways and lTD cannot delegate this

29 Brief of Respondent, State ofIdaho Idaho Transportation Department, p. 2; Respondent City of Meridian's Brief,
pp.8-9.
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authority to the City. It is fine if the City decides to zone a property for residential use and the
State provides access adequate for residential purposes. However, the City cannot control
access.

2. lTD and the City do not share control over access easements.
lTD and the City both contend that decisions over access are divided between the State
and the City.3o Specifically, the City can control a private property owner's ability to leave or
enter private property. At the same time, the State controls the property owner's ability to enter
and leave the state right of way. lTD takes the position even further by stating that lTD can
grant and deny access permits, while the City only has the power to deny access permits.
Wylie agrees with both the City and lTD that lTD has the power to grant or deny access
permits to state highways. However, Wylie contends that lTD and the City have provided no
authority for their assertion that the City can regulate or deny access to State highways. This
assertion runs contrary to the Idaho Code, IDAPA, and the holdings in Lochsa Falls, City of
Sandpoint, and Judge Burnett's dissent in Worley Highway District, which was adopted in City
ojSandpoint, infra or supra. Lochsa Falls specifically sets forth the rule that only lTD can grant

or deny access to state highways.

a. Access easements are not dual in their nature.
The very nature of the property interest commonly referred to as an access easement does
not support lTD and the City's position. The City and lTD both state that the right of access has
two components. According to their view, a right of access is split down the property line one
side is controlled by the City and the other part of the right is controlled by lTD. However, the
law of easements does not support this dual nature of an access easement.
30 Brief of Respondent, State ofIdaho Idaho Transportation Department, pp. 16-20; Respondent City of Meridian's
Brief, pp. 16-24.
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This Court has described the nature of an access easement in Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho
286,293,328 P.2d 397, 400-01 (1958)31, which follows:
Real property includes 'that which is appurtenant to the land.' I.C. sec. 55-101. It
includes all easements attached to the land. I.C. sec. 55-603. It includes hereditaments,
whether corporeal or incorporeal, such as easements, and every interest in lands. 73
C.J.S. Property § 7, p. 159. (emphasis added).
Easements are included in the classification of estates and rights in lands which may be
taken for public use. I.C. sec. 7-702.
In 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 105, p. 910, is to be found the following rule:

'An easement is an interest in land for which the owner is entitled to
compensation, as much so as if the land to which the easement is appurtenant
were taken or injured. Thus the owner of land abutting on a street or highway
has a private right in such street or highway[ ... ]. (emphasis added).
According to Hughes, the ability to leave one's property and enter onto an abutting street
is an easement of access. This easement of access does not "begin" on the property owner's land
and "end" in the public right of way, as the City and lTD contend. Rather, it is a property right
in the public right of way, which is attached to the abutter's land. An appurtenant easement exits
outside ofthe land to which it is attached. Therefore, there is nothing which begins on an
abutter's land the City can regulate. Only lTD can regulate state highways and access
easements, which by their very nature exist in state highways. Quite literally, an access
easement in a state highway exists outside of a municipality's jurisdiction.
The City and lTD cite no authority which holds that a private property owner must get
permission from a municipality or any other government entity to leave their own property.
C. Public policy limits the ability for government entities to contract

When compared to private individuals, government entities are much lllore constrained in
their ability to enter into binding contracts. Generally, private individuals cannot contract to

31

Partially overruled on other grounds.
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perform illegal acts. ITD cites to Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 944 P.2d 695 (1997) and

Morrison v. Young, 136 Idaho 316, 32 P.3d 1116 (2001), as examples of contracts which require
performances that are so vile this Court has referred to the subject matter as evi1. 32 This is the
general limitation which applies to all contracts.
While this public policy limitation also applies to government contracts, limitations on
the government's ability to contract based on public policy grounds is much more confined than
private individuals. In the context of a government contract, if the contracting entity does not
have the authority to regulate a subject matter it cannot enter into contracts which deal with that
subject matter. 33 Even in instances where the subject matter itself is rather benign or even
arguably good for society, these contracts are still void. The public policy offended by these
contracts is not the actual subject matter but the allocation of government powers.
An example ofthis can be found in Black v. Young, 122 Idaho 302,834 P.2d 304 (1992).

In that case, the City of Ketchum conveyed an alley to private property owners. The subject
matter of that transaction was not an evil or malum in se. This was merely a common place
transfer of real property. However, the City of Ketchum did not abandon the alley in accordance
with the applicable laws governing a municipalities' ability to convey property. The contract
was voided under the doctrine of ultra vires. Even though the property owners signed an
estoppel affidavit, precluding them from challenging the ordinance, they were still able to
challenge the City Ketchum because the agreements were all ultra vires. Wylie did not sign any
agreement expressly saying that he would not seek access to SH 20/26. Even ifhe did, the
waiver and the contractual obligation to not seek access would be ultra vires, and therefore void.

32
33

Brief of Respondent, State of Idaho Idaho Transportation Department, p. 21.
See Olympic Pipe Line Co. v. City of Seattle, 437 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2006).
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Two examples ofthese limitations on the government's ability to contract have been
argued by Wylie. One of the most fundamental public policies in our system of government is
limited government. The doctrine of ultra vires is the means by which courts void government
contracts which are entered into without any power and are in violation of the public policy of
limited government.
Another strong policy is that of subordination of inferior government entities, which
facilitates a uniform system of laws. This is embodied in the Federal Supremacy Clause, and in
Idaho's doctrine offield preemption. The law of contracts cannot be used by inferior
government entities to usurp a superior government entity's power.
In the context of field preemption, this public policy was articulated by the 9th Circuit in

Olympic Pipe Line Co. v. City of Seattle, 437 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2006). In that case, the public
policy of uniform application of laws, as embodied in the doctrine offield preemption, was used
to void a contract whereby private parties agreed with the City of Seattle to adhere to safety
standards which were higher than the standards required by a federallaw?4
ITD has argued that this case is inapposite because the City and the State can both control
access on their respective "turfs. ,,35 Again by enabling the City to control access on "its turf'
would require this Court to rule that an access easement is bifurcated in its nature and controlled
by two separate entities. There is no authority for this position. More importantly, this outcome
would destroy the State's control over its own highways. In instances where a municipal
government disagrees with the State's decision to locate a highway, the municipality could
pressure the State with its ability to deny all access to the highway. The "inferior" municipalities

34
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For a full discussion of this case see Appellants briefpp. 31-32; 37-38.
Brief of Respondent, State ofIdaho Idaho Transportation Department, p. 22.
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could functionally control the "superior" State concerning new access to state highways through
the use development agreements.
lTD also argues that the waiver issue contained in Olympic Pipe Line Co. v. City 0/

Seattle, 437 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2006) is distinguishable from this case. However, lTD uses no
material reason to distinguish Olympic Pipe Line from the facts of this case. In both cases, a city
government required private parties agree to adhere to a safety regulation. 36 In both cases,
authority to promulgate the safety regulations where controlled by a superior government entity.
In Olympic Pipe Line, the 9th Circuit held that contract was not void because the subject matter
was evil, it was void because preemption cannot be waived. In other words, government entities
cannot use the law of contracts to usurp another entities power. All actions which are preempted
are void; they cannot be waived.
lTD cites to American Energy Corp. v. Texas Eastern Transmission, LP, 2010 WL
1253920 (S.D. Ohio), for the proposition that preemption does not apply when the alleged
preempted act does not deal with the subject matter of the controlling statute. However, this
distinction does not apply, because as pointed out by in the City o/Sandpoint, supra., the
LLUP A deals with land use planning and Title 40 of the Idaho Code deals with highways. Wylie
is claiming that the City'S attempt to use the LLUPA to control his access is expressly preempted
by Title 40 ofthe Idaho Code. Just like Olympic Pipe Line, where the City of Seattle could not
pass a safety regulation in contravention of the PSA, here the City cannot use the LLUP A in
contravention of Title 40 of the Idaho Code.

One of the City's rationales for denying Wylie access was based on health and safety concerns. See R. Vol. 2, p.
328

36
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lTD draws various distinctions between the cases cited by Wylie used to support his
contention that ultra vires and field preemption can void otherwise enforceable contracts. 37 lTD
argues that some cases are factually distinguishable because under those fact patterns improper
procedure was followed. However, the only argument made is that the City is not acting outside
its authority. That argument again rests on the conclusion of what entity controls access to SH
20/26. In the event it is deemed that the City Ordinance 05-1171 is either ultra vires and/or

preempted, lTD has provided no argument that those cases cannot be used to void the portions of
the Development Agreement which were made in reliance on the Ordinance.
Olympic Pipe Line is a key case because it rebuts both the City and lTD's arguments on

justiciability.
1. The City cannot contract in the same capacity as an individual.

Wylie does not dispute that the City has the power to contract under I.e. § 50-301, and
the ability to enter into development agreements under I.C. § 67-6511A. However, the ability to
contract is still limited by all the rules advocated by Wylie in this brief and in his opening brief,
i.e. ultra vires and field preemption. For example, I.e. § 50-301does not proved the City with
the same powers to contract as private individuals. The relevant portion of I.e. § 50-301 states:
50-301. CORPORATE AND LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT POWERS. Cities
governed by this act shall [... ] contract and be contracted with [... ] and exercise all
powers and perform all functions of local self-government in city affairs as are not
specificallyprohibited by or in conflict with the general laws or the constitution of the
state of Idaho. (emphasis added).
This limitation on the City's ability to contract is the very limitation proffered by Wylie
in his opening brief. Specifically, Wylie argued that municipalities cannot pass ordinances
which conflict with the general laws. The general laws of the State are legislation passed by the

37
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state legislature. 38 Preemption and ultra vires doctrines are two means by which the judiciary
enforces this restriction on the powers of municipalities.

D. lTD should be judicially estopped from asserting the City can control access to state
highways
lTD accurately points out that judicially estoppel's preclusive effect only applies on the
same transaction. 39 At the very least, lTD's statements in previous litigation undercut its
assertion that municipal governments can control access to state highways. They also function
as statements against interest and admissions.
In Moody v. lTD, as stated by lTD, Judge McKee ruled that municipalities cannot control
access to state-highways. Wylie'S Counsel was advocating a different position than they are
now. However, Counsel lost and is not advocating a position consistent with Judge McKee's
ruling. One the other hand, lTD advocated an inconsistent position, won that action, and is now
advocating a contrary position. lTD was the party that gained an advantage concerning one
position and is now contradicting that position. Moreover, lTD is the same party in both actions.
Wylie's Counsel is private and represents different clients in different actions. Therefore, the
policy of inconsistent positions is more applicable to lTD.
As pointed out by lTD "[Judge McKee ... ] noted that lTD has the discretion to determine
whether such ordinances are beneficial to the state highway system.,,40 This is consistent with
Wylie's position that the City can make recommendations concerning access to state highways
located within their boundaries. But it is lTD which untimely decides to adhere to these
decisions.

39

Appellant's Brief, pp. 16-17.
Brief of Respondent, State ofIdaho Idaho Transportation Department, p. 25.
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Brief of Respondent, State ofIdaho Idaho Transportation Department, p. 26.
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ITD distinguishes Willowbrook Development v. State of Idaho, et al., on the basis that it
does not involve LLUPA. 41 However, and in accordance with the City of Sandpoint, the LLUPA
does not deal with highways, therefore the justification in this case that the City has authority of
over access based on LLUP A is inapposite. Willowbrook represents another example oflTD
being inconsistent.
ITD argues that its position In the Matter of the City of Eagle has not changed because
lTD was arguing that a municipality could not grant access it could only deny access. 42 This
distinction hinges on the State's argument that control of access is bifurcated. However this
argument was not proposed in City of Eagle. ITD was advocating that only ITD controlled
access to state highways which is inconsistent with its current bifurcation argument.
In the previous cases, lTD has asserted that it controls access to state highways. In none
of these proceedings has it advocated that municipalities can deny access and only the State can
grant access. This current permutation from the previous monolithic assertion that only ITD can
control access is inconsistent and lTD should be estopped. As mentioned above, a key
distinction between ITD and Wylie's Counsel is that lTD was the same client and private
counsel represents a wide variety of clients.

III. CONCLUSION
This case centers on the issues of field preemption and ultra vires. The effort by the City
and the State to convince this Court that there is a genuine issue of waiver is nothing more than
an attempt to divert attention away from these two critical issues. They have cited no legal
authority that contradicts either the Idaho or foreign case law cited by Wylie regarding ultra vires
or field preemption because there isn't any. It does not matter how the City and State have
41
42

Brief of Respondent, State of Idaho Idaho Transportation Department, p. 27 .
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attempted to enable the City to control state highways. Any means by which the City has
asserted control over a state highway, either by contract or ordinance, is utterly void and has no
force oflaw.
lTD and the City have proposed a novel theory which would enable both entities to
control access to state highways. That theory is that lTD controls the right of access with the
State's right of way and the City controls the right of access outside ofthe state's right of way.
Being a novel theory, nether entity can cite to any authority supporting their contention. This is
really an invitation to create new rules governing real property.
From a policy perspective, this argument threatens the ability of private property owners
to receive the protections provided in Article I, § 14 of the Idaho Constitution. Under the
foregoing section of the Idaho Constitution, private property cannot be condemned by the
government without payment of just compensation. However clear the previous statement is
made, proving liability in some contexts can be difficult. If two entities can deny the ability to
exercise the same property right, a condemning authority will always be able to point the finger
at the other entity when facing liability.

Ultimate authority to grant or deny access should (and

Wylie contends, does) lie with only one entity.
In Idaho, property can be regulated and it can be condemned. In the context of
regulation, a private property owner can receive compensation when property is regulated to the
point that it has lost almost all its economic value. In the specific context of access rights, when
those rights are regulated the property owner must prove that access has been substantially
impaired. See Mabe, supra. This is a high threshold and accordingly it is difficult to prove.
Another important issue is that access is one of the most valuable property rights. The
same property in the same location can be worthless or worth millions depending on access. So
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when access rights are condemned, the severance damages for the loss of access can be one of
the most expensive components in an eminent domain case.
With that background, it makes sense why two governing entities would want to be able
to bifurcate the control of access. The City could regulate access rights and incur no liability and
the State could condemn right of way and not pay just compensation for the condemnation of
access rights because the City regulated access away before the condemnation of access.
Although there is no expression of motive in this case, both the City and lTD have admitted they
are working together to deny access to state highways in the City of Meridian. 43 The record
indicates that the reason behind this is corridor preservation, which follows:
PURPOSE: .. .2) to preserve right-of-way for future highway expansion.

44

The admission is that that both lTD and the City have worked together to develop the
City Ordinance which has the express goal to preserve corridor for future highway expansions.
In other words, the goal behind this City Ordinance is to make it less expensive for the State to
condemn right-of-way in the future. A means by which the State and City are working together
to avoid paying the full market value of private property the State condemns should not be
sanctioned. This plan, if not in direct contravention of the Idaho Constitution, is at least contrary
to the spirit of private property rights and due process of law.
There is a difference between coordination and input, as envisioned by LLUPA, and
power sharing, as now argued in a novel way by the City and the State. The State has attempted
to get the City to assist it in "preserving corridors" for future condemnation by enacting
Ordinance 05-1170. The City has gone along with this idea and has used the ordinance to deny

Brief of Respondent, State of Idaho Idaho Transportation Department, p. 2; Respondent City of Meridian's Brief,
pp.8-9.
44 R. Vol. I, P 13l.
43
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access to property owners like Wylie, who have abutter's rights of access which may be
reasonably regulated only by the entity with legal authority and control over the public right of
way.
The City doesn't share access control over Linder with ACHD and access control over
Chinden (SH20/26) with the State. The City controls land use, density and related issues, not
access.
The ordinance, and the goal of "corridor preservation," is to prevent property owners
from fully enjoying their property rights and fully developing their property so that it is cheaper
for the government to acquire later. This is fundamentally wrong and in direct contradiction to
the constitution.
The government can option land, or purchase development rights, or acquire land now
that will not be needed for new construction until a few years from now. The government cannot
prevent owners from fully using land that the government envisions condemning later. This
appeal deals with academic issues of ultra vires and field preemption, but the heart of the matter
is a concerted, and very real, effort to avoid paying just compensation for property rights
acquired in condemnation, which is effecting the rights ofldaho citizens like Wylie every day.
DATED this 13 th day of August, 2010.

By______~~~~_=~~~L----
E DON COPPLE, of the firm
Attorneys for Appellant
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